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Abstract. We present an algorithm for counting points on superelliptic
curves y
r
= f(x) over a nite eld F
q
of small characteristic dierent
from r. This is an extension of an algorithm for hyperelliptic curves due
to Kedlaya. In this extension, the complexity, assuming r and the genus
are xed, is O(log
3+"
q) in time and space, just like for hyperelliptic
curves. We give some numerical examples obtained with our rst imple-
mentation, thus proving that cryptographic sizes are now reachable.
1 Introduction
In the past few years a lot of candidates have been proposed to enlarge the set of
groups that can be used in protocols based on the discrete logarithm problem like
DiÆe{Hellman or ElGamal. Beside the classical multiplicative groups of nite
elds, the most famous are certainly the systems based on elliptic curves [21,
26]. Indeed, for these systems the only general attacks known are variants of the
Pollard Rho method which require exponential time computation; in practice it
means that the key size is much shorter than in a system that uses nite elds.
Thereafter, systems based on hyperelliptic curves were proposed [22]. They seem
to have the same advantages as elliptic curve cryptosystems (at least when the
genus is less than 4 [1, 14]).
More recently, systems based on the discrete logarithm problem in the Ja-
cobians of other curves were designed. Namely, in the literature, we can now
nd algorithms for working in Jacobians of superelliptic curves [13] and of C
ab
curves [2]. Several works related to these curves have already been published,
concerning security issues [4], eÆciency [17, 6], building curves with known num-
ber of points [3], or possible use in a Weil restriction attack on elliptic curves
[5]. The next step for studying the possible cryptographic use of these curves
is to conceive an algorithm for counting points of the Jacobian of a random
curve. Indeed, this is thought to be one of the most secure ways of building a
cryptosystem by a large part of the community.
In the case of elliptic curves, this problem of point counting has been a chal-
lenge of the past 15 years and nowadays we have satisfactory solutions. When
the characteristic of the base eld is large the best known method is Schoof's
algorithm and all the improvements leading to the so-called Schoof{Elkies{Atkin
algorithm. We refer to [7] or [23] for surveys of these techniques and to the refer-
ences therein. Besides some theoretical results [29] and an attempt to make them
practical [15], extending the SEA algorithm to higher genus has not yet proven
to be enough for cryptographic sizes. The situation is quite dierent in small
characteristic: two years ago, Satoh [32] showed that p-adic methods using the
canonical lift could lead to an algorithm asymptotically faster than SEA. Some
work has been done consequently on the subject to extend it to characteristic
2 [33, 9], to implement it and obtain new records [9], to use less memory [34],
and to combine it with an early-abort strategy for generating secure curves [10].
Mestre, Harley and Gaudry recently proposed a related algorithm, based on the
arithmetic-geometric mean, for elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves of genus
2 in characterstic 2; a nice feature of this technique is that it does not explic-
itly make use of j-invariants, of modular equations nor of Velu-type formulae,
and these had previously been the main obstructions to generalizing beyond
the elliptic case. However, the AGM method does not seem to extend easily to
non-hyperelliptic curves. Another approach, also using p-adic methods but not
based on canonical lifting, has been proposed by Kedlaya [18]. His method ap-
plies to hyperelliptic curves in small odd characteristic. The complexity in time
is O(log
3+"
q), for curves over F
q
of xed genus, i.e. the same as all the variants
of Satoh's method and the complexity in space is O(log
3
q) which is the same as
Satoh's original algorithm, but bad compared to the algorithm of [34] or AGM.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: rstly we show that Kedlaya's al-
gorithm can be extended in a rather straightforward way to superelliptic curves;
secondly we report some results obtained with our rst implementation writ-
ten in Magma. To our knowledge, these are the rst published point counting
computations for random hyperelliptic and superelliptic curves of cryptographic
sizes.
The paper is organized as follows: after recalling some basics about curves
and p-adic numbers, we describe Kedlaya's original algorithm and show how to
adapt it for superelliptic curves. Then we give some more details on the way
these algorithms can be handled in practice and we estimate the complexity. We
conclude by numerical examples and remarks about the use of these curves in
cryptography.
2 Background on Algebraic Curves and p-adic Number
Rings
In this section, we recall some basic facts about algebraic curves over nite elds
and p-adic numbers. We shall not give precise denitions and we refer the reader
to classical books on the subject ([12, 20, 19, 24] for instance).
2.1 Hyperelliptic and Superelliptic Curves
Let F
q
be a nite eld with q = p
n
elements. We shall consider only two types
of curves over F
q
, namely hyperelliptic and superelliptic curves.
Denition 1 A superelliptic curve is a plane curve C which admits an aÆne
equation of the form
y
r
= f(x);
where r is a prime dierent from p and f is monic, squarefree of degree d coprime
to r.
With such a denition, C is non-singular in its aÆne part, and admits a unique
place of degree 1 at innity. Moreover its genus is given by g =
(d 1)(r 1)
2
.
Denition 2 In characteristic dierent from 2, a hyperelliptic curve is a su-
perelliptic curve whose equation is of the form y
2
= f(x), with r = 2 and f of
degree 2g + 1.
Note that there exists a more general denition of hyperelliptic curves which
do not exclude the case of characteristic 2. But the algorithms we will describe
work only for this particular case.
Let C be a superelliptic curve of genus g. Associated to this curve, one can
dene its Jacobian, noted J(C), which is a nite abelian group. In the past few
years, several algorithms were developed to compute explicitly in this group [13,
2, 17, 6]. The next step is to study the order of J(C). For this the q-th power
Frobenius endomorphism and its characteristic polynomial (T ) are key tools.
More precisely, (T ) can be written as
(T ) =
2g
X
i=0
a
i
T
i
; with a
2g
= 1; a
i
= q
g i
a
2g i
for i = 0; : : : ; g   1;
and all its roots have absolute value
p
q. This is essentially the Riemann Hypoth-
esis for zeta functions of curves. For us, the interesting fact is that #J(C) = (1).
Our goal in this paper is to compute (T ) and to obtain #J(C) as a byproduct.
2.2 The Ring Z
q
Let K be the (unique up to isomorphism) unramied extension of degree n of
Q
p
; its residual eld is F
q
. We denote by Z
q
the ring of integers of K. In order
to construct it, we can start with the polynomial P (t) which denes F
q
as an
algebraic extension of F
p
; we then consider the extension
Z
q
:= Z
p
[t]=(P (t));
where the polynomial P (t) is obtained from P (t) by lifting trivially its coeÆ-
cients to p-adic integers. In practice, an element z of Z
q
can be represented as
a polynomial z = z
n 1
t
n 1
+ z
n 2
t
n 2
+   + z
1
t+ z
0
taken modulo P (t) and
where the z
i
are integers modulo a power of p called the precision at which the
computation is done.
It can be shown that the Galois group of K over Q
p
is cyclic. We will denote
by  the unique generator, also called Frobenius, of this Galois group that reduces
modulo p to the p-th power Frobenius in F
q
. There is no trivial formula for
writing z

for an element z in Z
q
expressed on a polynomial basis as above.
Later on, we will describe how to precompute t

and then z

is obtained as
follows:
z

=
 
n 1
X
i=0
z
i
t
i
!

=
n 1
X
i=0
z
i
(t

)
i
:
3 Kedlaya's Algorithm and its Extension
3.1 Overview of Kedlaya's Algorithm for Hyperelliptic Curves
Let C be a hyperelliptic curve of genus g given by its equation y
2
= f(x) over
F
q
. Following the construction of Kedlaya (see also [20], page 72), we consider
the curve C
0
obtained from C by removing the point at innity and the points
with vertical tangent (i.e. y = 0).
There is a way to lift the coordinate ring of C
0
called the weak completion [27],
with the nice property that its cohomology veries a \Lefschetz trace formula"
[28] and hence gives information about the cardinalities of the initial curve C.
Taking a lowbrow point of view in which we can forget about the curve C
0
,
we shall work on the vector space generated over the p-adic number eld K by
the following dierential forms:
D =

x
i
dx
y
; i 2 [0; 2g   1]

;
in which we have the relations coming from the equation of the curve and
d'(x; y)  0 for every rational function '. On the dierential forms one can
dene a Frobenius action which is compatible with the p-th power Frobenius
on C: take x

= x
p
, y

given by (y

)
2
= f(x)

and (dx)

= px
p 1
dx. Kedlaya
shows in a constructive way that the space D is stable under the action of this .
Hence  is an endomorphism of a vector space of dimension 2g; and everything
is done in order for its characteristic polynomial to be closely related to the
(T ) we are looking for. The heart of Kedlaya's algorithm is then to compute
the matrix of  for the given basis of D.
For each i in [0; 2g   1],

x
i
dx
y


=
1
y

px
ip+p 1
dx;
therefore the tricky part is the computation of
1
y

. This is not dened in a lifted
coordinate ring because it involves a square root and that is a reason why we
use the weak completion. From a practical point of view, it means that we shall
be able to expand
1
y

as a power series in  =
1
y
2
: starting with the denition
(y

)
2
= f(x)

, we have
1
y

= (f(x)

)
 1=2
= (f(x)

  f(x)
p
+ f(x)
p
)
 1=2
= (f(x)
p
)
 1=2

1 +
f(x)

 f(x)
p
f(x)
p

 1=2
=
1
y
p
(1 + 
p
(f(x)

  f(x)
p
))
 1=2
:
By the usual power series expansion of (1 +X)
 1=2
we get an expression of the
form
1
y

= y
 p
X
k0
P
k
(x)
pk
= y
 1

(p 1)=2
X
k0
P
k
(x)
pk
:
Note that p divides (f(x)

  f(x)
p
) so that the power of p dividing P
k
(x) tends
to innity as k grows (actually this is what is expected due to the theoretical
construction of the weak completion). We can now write

x
i
dx
y


=
0
@
X
k0
Q
k
(x)
k
1
A
dx
y
;
where Q
k
(x) are polynomials. The algorithm proceeds as follows: we compute
this expression up to some precision in  , and then we use the relations in D
described above to reduce the expression to a polynomial of degree at most 2g 1,
times
dx
y
. In this way we shall prove that D is indeed -stable and moreover we
obtain an explict description of the action of  on the basis. For this we will use
three strategies of reduction:
Red 1. First of all, using the equation of the curve, one can write
Q
k
(x)
k
= (
k
(x)f(x) + 
k
(x))
k
= 
k
(x)
k 1
+ 
k
(x)
k
;
where 
k
and 
k
are the quotient and the remainder in the division of Q
k
by f . Therefore one can assume that Q
k
(x) is of degree at most 2g for all k,
except for Q
0
(x) for which one can show that the degree is at most 2pg  1.
Red 2. Then we use the relations of cohomology to rewrite the series in the
form Q(x)
dx
y
. Fix k  1 and consider the term Q
k
(x)
k
dx
y
. Let U(x) and
V (x) be such that Q
k
(x) = U(x)f(x) + V (x)f
0
(x) (they do exist because f
is squarefree). Using
d

V (x)
y
2k 1

 0;
one obtains
Q
k
(x) 
k
dx
y


U(x) +
2
2k   1
V
0
(x)


k 1
dx
y
:
Repeating this for decreasing k's, we can rewrite everything on the constant
term of the series.
Red 3. Finally, in the expression Q(x)
dx
y
that we obtained, one can reduce the
degree Æ of Q to at most 2g   1 in the following way. Assume Æ  2g: using
d(x
Æ 2g
y)  0;
one gets a polynomial of degree Æ that can be subtracted from Q.
At this point, we have computed a 2g  2g matrix M such that
0
B
B
@
dx
y
.
.
.
x
2g 1
dx
y
1
C
C
A

= M
0
B
B
@
dx
y
.
.
.
x
2g 1
dx
y
1
C
C
A
:
Most of the operations done during the computation involve elements of Z
q
, but
at the end we may have to divide by small powers of p. Finally the coeÆcients
of M lie in p
 s
Z
q
with a small, predictable s, which depends only on p and g.
The nal step is then to compute the characteristic polynomial of the matrix
MM

  M

n 1
;
which has coeÆcients in Z
2
and is a p-adic approximation of (T ).
3.2 Superelliptic Curves
Let C be a superelliptic curve given by its equation y
r
= f(x) with f of degree d
over F
q
. The theory is exactly the same as for hyperelliptic curves. In the present
case, the space of dierential forms we consider is

x
i
dx
y
j
; i 2 [0; d  2]; j 2 [1; r   1]

:
The Frobenius action lifting the p-th power Frobenius on C is dened similarly:
take x

= x
p
, y

given by (y

)
r
= f(x)

and (dx)

= px
p 1
dx.
Again, the space of dierential forms has been chosen such that it is stable
under the action of ; we will now describe the reduction process which allows
us to rewrite

x
i
dx
y
j


over the basis. Fix an i 2 [0; d   2] and a j 2 [1; r   1].
We can write

1
y
j


as a power series

1
y
j


= y
 jp

1 +
f(x)

  f(x)
p
y
rp

 j=r
= y
 jp
X
k0
P
k
(x)
pk
;
where we have set  = y
 r
. Hence we can write

x
i
dx
y
j


=
0
@
X
k0
Q
k
(x)
k
1
A
dx
y
jp mod r
:
In the following, we let ` = jp mod r. We now proceed with three reduction
steps similar to those we had for hyperelliptic curves.
Red 1. First, use the equation of the curve to obtain a series where the Q
k
(x)
are of degree at most d  1, except for the rst one.
Red 2. Then, rewrite the term in 
k
as a term in 
k 1
. For k  1, let U(x) and
V (x) be such that Q
k
(x) = U(x)f(x) + V (x)f
0
(x), one has
Q
k
(x) 
k
dx
y
`


U(x) +
r
r(k   1) + `
V
0
(x)


k 1
dx
y
`
:
Red 3. Finally, we are left with an expression of the form Q(x)
dx
y
`
, whereQ(x) is
a polynomial of degree Æ that we can reduce to degree at most d 2: assume
Æ  d   1, the exact dierential d(x
Æ d+1
y
r l
)  0 gives a polynomial of
degree Æ that can be subtracted from Q(x).
We obtain a 2g 2g matrix M and we conclude as before by taking the charac-
teristic polynomial of its \norm".
Note that the dierential forms in
dx
y
j
are sent by  to the subspace generated
by forms in
dx
y
`
with ` = jp mod r. As a consequence, M is a matrix that can
be viewed in blocks of size d   1, with the property that there is exactly one
non-zero block in each row block and each column block.
4 Details and Complexity
4.1 Precision of the Computation
The intermediate result obtained from the algorithm of section 3 is an approx-
imation of the polynomial (T ) that we are looking for, and by computing to
suÆcient precision we can determine it exactly. Two parameters have to be
tuned, to ensure that at the end we get enough information to conclude. The
rst is the p-adic precision p

at which we truncate elements of Z
p
. The second
is the  -adic precision at which we truncate the series.
Bounds on the coeÆcients of (T ) can be deduced from the bounds on its
roots: ja
i
j 
 
2g
i

q
i=2
for i 2 [1; g]. We assume that q is large compared to the
genus, so that a
g
determines the required precision. Hence we need to know
(T ) modulo d2
 
2g
g

q
g=2
e to be sure to recover all the coeÆcients. Therefore the
working precision should be at least
 =

log
p

2

2g
g

q
g=2

:
The precision in  is more problematic: at rst sight it is not clear that we
do not need all the terms of the series to get a result which makes sense even
modulo p. Actually in the power series expansion, one can see that the coeÆcient
in 
k
(which is a polynomial over Z
q
) is divisible by a power of p which grows
to innity at the speed of k=p. Hence it appears that the precision  in  should
be at least p times the p-adic precision . Moreover, the reduction process also
perturbs things: starting with a term Q
k
(x)
k
dx
y
`
, with p
m
dividing Q
k
(x), one
reduces to a dierential form Q(x)
dx
y
`
and p
m
does not divide Q(x) any more.
In Lemma 1 of [18], Kedlaya shows that we can bound the loss of precision by
log
p
(rk+`). Acordingly, it is suÆcient to enlarge  slightly to ensure that at the
end we have the required precision. A tedious calculation leads to the following
choice for : we take the smallest  such that
 > p  
p
r
+ p log
p
((r + 1)  1):
4.2 Detailed Algorithm
We summarize the algorithm in the following:
Input: A superelliptic curve y
r
= f(x) over F
q
, q = p
n
, the degree of f is noted
d, g =
(d 1)(r 1)
2
.
Output: The characteristic polynomial (T ).
1. Set the p-adic working precision  = dlog
p
(2
 
2g
g

q
g=2
)e and set the maximal
precision  for the series to be the smallest value such that  > p  
p
r
+
p log
p
((r + 1)  1).
2. Let S = 1 + (f(x)

  f(x)
p
) 
p
, where f(x) is the polynomial f(x) where
the coeÆcients are lifted arbitrarily from F
q
to Z
q
.
3. Compute S
 1=r
as a truncated series in  , to precision 

.
For this, use a Newton iteration X  
1
r
((r+1)X SX
r+1
), initialized with
X = 1. At each step in the recursion, use Red1 to keep the coeÆcients of
the series of degree at most d  1.
4. Compute S
 j=r
for j 2 [2; r   1] up to precision 

. This is done by multi-
plying S
 1=r
by itself repeatedly; again, use Red1 after each multiplication.
5. For each i 2 [0; d  2] and j 2 [1; r   1] do
a. Compute !
ij
=

x
i
dx
y
j


= p
jp div r
x
ip+p 1
S
 j=r
dx
y
jp mod r
.
b. Use Red 2 to write !
ij
in the form Q(x)
dx
y
jp mod r
.
During this reduction it is sometimes necessary to divide by an integer
which is divisible by p. In theory, this ought to reduce the precision of
the computation. Actually, when this occurs, one adds some arbitrary
noise to \force" the precision to remain maximal. This strange way of
doing things does not actually aect the nal result because this noise
will cancel out during the whole process. This is ensured by Lemma 1 in
[18], which extends naturally to the superelliptic case.
c. Use Red 3 to reduce the degree of Q(x).
6. Compute the matrix M , its norm and its characteristic polynomial e(T ) =
P
0k2g
~a
k
T
k
.
7. For k 2 [1; g], nd the integer a
k
in [ 
p

2
;
p

2
] congruent to ~a
k
modulo p

.
Return the corresponding (T ).
4.3 Complexity
For the complexity analysis we shall make the following assumptions:
{ The characteristic p is xed;
{ The parameters r and d of the curves are xed, hence also the genus;
{ Each time we have to do a multiplication between two elements of a rather
complicated structure (truncated series over polynomials over polynomials
over integers), we assume that we pack everything into large integers and that
we use Schonhage's fast multiplication algorithm. A multiplication between
two objects of bit-size N is then assumed to take time O(N
1+"
).
In Step 2 we have to apply Frobenius to some elements of Z
q
. For this, note
that t being a root of P (t), so is t

. Therefore, t

can be obtained by a Newton
iterationX  X P (X)=P
0
(X) initialized with t
p
. This is just a precomputation
and moreover the cost is comparable to the rest of the algorithm. Thereafter, it
is possible to obtain the Frobenius of an element in Z
q
in time O(n
3+"
).
Step 3 is a Newton lifting. The cost is bounded by a constant times the
cost of the last iteration. This last iteration costs a few multiplications between
objects which are polynomials of degree  over polynomials of degree d  1 with
coeÆcients in Z
q
. An element of Z
q
is of bit-size n, therefore the bit-size of the
objects is nd = O(n
3+"
). Hence the O(1) multiplications we have to do in
the nal iteration take time in O(n
3+"
). Applying Red 1 to the result has the
same asymptotic complexity (we have to visit the whole object and the runtime
is linear in its size) but is faster in practice. Finally the overall complexity of
Step 3 is in O(n
3+"
).
In Step 4 we do a constant number of multiplications (remember r is constant)
and then an application of Red 1 to objects of size in O(n
3+"
). Again the
complexity is O(n
3+"
). Note that in the hyperelliptic case, this step does not
exist.
In Step 5 we repeat a reduction process 2g times using Red 2 and Red 3.
More precisely, Substep 5.a is only reorganizing and applying Red 1; this takes
negligible time. In Substep 5.b we repeat  times a process which involves ele-
mentary operations over polynomials of degree at most d over Z
q
, i.e. a constant
number of operations in Z
q
. Hence Substep 5.b has a cost in O(n
3+"
). The third
reduction in Substep 5.c is negligible.
In Step 6 the costly part is to compute the norm of the matrix. By a recursive
\divide and conquer" computation, we can save some of the costly Frobenius
computations and obtain a runtime again in O(n
3+"
). In [31], Satoh proposes
another method which can moreover save memory.
Putting everything together, the complexity of the algorithm is O(n
3+"
) in
time and in space.
5 Numerical Results and Cryptographic Signicance
As far as we know, even the original algorithm of Kedlaya has not yet been
tested in practice. Therefore, we did our rst implementation with the rst aim of
validating Kedlaya's algorithm and our extension. We usedMagma, version 2:7,
which allowed us to easily manipulate quite complicated objects: it is possible in
Magma to construct the ring Z
q
and to build the ring of series over polynomials
over Z
q
which is required. However, by taking such a high programming level, we
can not really hope to do all the optimizations we could dream of; furthermore,
there are some small bugs in our version ofMagma which make us lose precision
from time to time and we had to take a (constant) added margin in the precision
of the computations. Therefore the results we give here are just meant to show
that the algorithm works in practice and that cryptographic sizes are clearly
reachable. We are currently working on an optimized implementation in C which
should reduce the runtime signicantly.
All the examples have been run on an Alpha EV6 at 667 MHz. The numbers
of points are small enough that it is possible to factor them and prove the results.
The space requirement was roughly 150 MB.
5.1 Hyperelliptic Examples
In the hyperelliptic case, we cannot take a eld of characteristic 2 for which the
algorithm is not designed. We carried out our experiments with nite elds of
characteristic 3.
Example 1.
In F
3
53
, we take the generator t given by t
53
+ 2t
4
+ 2t
3
+ 2t
2
+ 1 = 0 and
consider the genus 2 randomly chosen curve given by
y
2
= x
5
+ t
2321121798755003703020989
x
4
+ t
8444066873716648223072527
x
3
+
t
7946343052437940195139141
x
2
+ t
10959512142684015392587300
x+
t
11366373156356845343093334
:
After about 22 hours of computation we found the coeÆcients of its charac-
teristic polynomial to be
a
1
= 3767947898876;
a
2
= 16462680188903823501200294;
which yields a cardinality of
N = 375710212613709295385367112322529717794218564821248:
Example 2.
We took a randomly chosen curve over the nite eld F
q
with q = 3
37
. Let t
with minimal polynomial t
37
+ t
3
+ 2t
2
+2t+1, and consider the genus 3 curve
of equation
y
2
= x
7
+ t
145005605337803244
x
6
+ t
367106618571281107
x
5
+ t
377813655811225893
x
4
+
t
47288412099057887
x
3
+ t
55871015404698790
x
2
+ t
232037785016055219
x+
t
286815047052544398
:
After about 30 hours of computation we found the coeÆcients of its charac-
teristic polynomial to be
a
1
= 1128783670;
a
2
= 1117168429648455309;
a
3
= 886287268279616285414037148;
which yields a cardinality of
N = 91297581893980817420223885655399261733128358845689672:
5.2 Superelliptic Examples
For superelliptic curves, we concentrate on characteristic 2 which is the most
interesting case for practical applications.
Example 1.
In F
2
53
, we take the generator t given by t
53
+ t
6
+ t
2
+ t+1 = 0 and consider
the randomly chosen curve
y
3
= x
4
+ t
2256567407303775
x
3
+ t
7508555791178511
x
2
+
t
1136027055799467
x+ t
4967542575384673
:
After about 22 hours of computation we found the coeÆcients of its charac-
teristic polynomial to be
a
1
= 0;
a
2
=  2299871474212151;
a
3
= 0;
which yields a cardinality of
N = 730750818665451438386441787834386121601727865546:
The nullity of a
1
and a
2
is not a surprise: it is explained by the absence of
third roots of unity in the base eld (see below).
Example 2.
In F
2
58
, we take the generator t given by t
58
+ t
19
+ 1 = 0 and consider the
random curve
y
3
= x
4
+ t
184416898722999862
x
3
+ t
138153554162118062
x
2
+
t
90053985362597546
x+ t
159188191651769175
:
After about 28 hours of computation we found the coeÆcients of its charac-
teristic polynomial to be
a
1
= 1346491223;
a
2
= 540650236559852363;
a
3
= 106786896758507851646763008;
which yields a cardinality of
N = 23945242937891627923322882122316144789744381897954979:
The cardinalities we found were not (almost) prime and these curves should
not be used in cryptography. We could have repeated the computations for sev-
eral curves until we found a good curve. Note that an early-abort strategy cannot
be used in this context.
5.3 Some Remarks about Superelliptic Curves in Cryptography
When one wants to build a cryptosystem based upon a curve, there are some
security issues that have to be taken into account. Besides the fact that the
number of points of the Jacobian should be (almost) prime, the following attacks
(or threats) should be avoided:
1. Index-calculus attack for high genus curves [14, 4]: the genus of the curve
should be at most 3.
2. MOV attack [25, 11]: the smallest k such that #J(C) j q
k
 1 should be large.
3. Ruck's attack [30]: the order of the subgroup in which we are working should
be coprime to p.
4. The curve should not have \special properties".
Item 1 means that we are left with a small choice of non-elliptic curves useful
for cryptography: hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 and 3, and superelliptic curves
of the form y
3
= f(x) with f of degree 4.
Items 2 and 3 are almost always fullled when we choose random curves and
the verication that this is indeed the case for a given curve is straightforward.
The fourth item is less precise but has its importance: nowadays some people
do not recommend to use elliptic curves for which the class number of the ring
of endomorphism is too small; the base eld should be a prime eld or a prime
extension eld due to the threat of an attack by Weil descent [16]; and more
generally any special behavior of the curves could be considered as suspect.
Keeping all this in mind, consider now a curve C of the form y
3
= f(x) with f
of degree 4 over a eld F
q
. Assume that q is congruent to 2 modulo 3. Then every
element of F
q
is a cube. Therefore #C=F
q
is equal to q + 1, counting the point
at innity. Furthermore this is the case in every extension of F
q
which does not
contain the third roots of unity, namely every odd degree extension. A simple
calculation with zeta functions shows that this implies that the coeÆcients a
1
and a
3
in the characteristic polynomial are zero, therefore (T ) is of the form
T
6
+ a
2
T
4
+ qa
2
T
2
+ q
3
, as we observed in Example 1. It means that this curve
is highly \non-random" among all the curves of genus 3. In particular, the 3-
torsion part of the Jacobian is partly degenerate which is a rst step towards
supersingularity. In [35], the reader will nd a survey about the gradation from
ordinary curves to supersingular curves and the link with the Newton polygon
of the characteristic polynomial.
Having noticed this, one is tempted to claim that it is safer to take a base eld
which includes the third roots of unity. However, we are confronted to another
problem, at least in characteristic 2. Indeed, F
2
n
will contain the third root of
unity if and only if n is even. We could then be subject to a Weil descent attack:
if n = 2m, by doing a Weil restriction on J(C), we get an abelian variety of
dimension 6 over F
2
m
. If someone is able to draw a curve of genus 6 on this
abelian variety, then the system is broken. As far as we know, nobody is able to
nd such a curve (if it exists!) but this could be threatening enough to discourage
the use C for cryptography.
This phenomenon is only true when one wants to use a base eld of small
characteristic. If we use a curve over a prime eld, no Weil descent attack is to
be feared and one can take a base eld with roots of unity. This implies that
there are additional automorphisms in the Jacobian and that the key-size should
be slightly enlarged accordingly [8].
6 Conclusion
We have presented an extension of Kedlaya's algorithm in order to count points
on superelliptic curves over nite elds of small characteristic. The time com-
plexity is the same as the complexity for hyperelliptic curves. This complex-
ity is asymptotically the same as the best known methods for counting points
on elliptic curves. Note however that the " which is involved in the expres-
sion O(log
3+"
q) does not hide the same logarithmic factors. We obtained some
numerical examples proving that it is now feasible to count points of random
hyperelliptic and superelliptic curves up to genus 3, for cryptographic sizes.
Further research topics are: extend Kedlaya's algorithm for hyperelliptic
curves to characteristic 2, reduce the space complexity to O(log
2
q), extend the
algorithm to C
ab
curves or even to more general varieties (in fact Monsky{
Washnitzer cohomology exists for more general varieties).
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